Greater Kuala Lumpur's Public Transport: Government Initiatives and Stakeholders Response

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Abstract: Since public transport plays a crucial role in metropolitan areas, it is important to learn more about how cities plan their public transport systems and to examine how people perceive public transport as a travel alternative, how they use it and how better and more frequent use can be achieved. Lack of knowledge among public transport users of what is being planned for them is a barrier to high levels of public transport use. This paper examines the latest development in the ways the city authorities in Greater Kuala Lumpur introduce innovative initiatives to enhance public transport system and how stakeholders responded to it. Greater Kuala Lumpur refers to the immediate areas beyond the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur boundaries, covering huge conurbation, extending from Kuala Lumpur to major population centers in the peripheries. This study found that The multimodal public transport system currently serving the cities in the conurbation is far from the desirable standard in term of availability, frequency, punctuality and rolling stock. Since 2009 the government has embarked on a series of measures to improve public transport services through fast-track planning and massive funding, aiming to increase public transport patronage in the conurbation from only 12% in 2008 to 25% in 2012 and finally 50% in 2020. While people who are carless, low income and dependent on public transport for mobility shows positive response to the plan, the same cannot be said about the car-dependent public. Without complementary measures to curb private car uses, the success of this government plans would be partial.

Key words: Greater Kuala Lumpur, Stakeholders, Track-based Public Transport, Mass Rapid Transit.

INTRODUCTION

Public transport plays an important role in achieving environmentally friendly and sustainable development in metropolitan areas (World Bank, 1996). It is therefore important to learn more about how cities plan their public transport systems and to examine how people perceive public transport as a travel alternative, how they use it and how better and more frequent use can be achieved (Ga’rling and Golledge, 2000). For public transport users, lack of knowledge of what is being planned for them, is considered, to some extent, to be a barrier to high levels of public transport use (Dziekan et al. 2007). Since it is widely recognised that people's perception of public transport services is generally pessimistic (Bonsall et al. 2004; Goodwin, 1997), it is of paramount importance to know how they response to a specific plan in order to gain their support that guarantee the success of the plan. Many cities have introduced innovative plans to improve public transport services. In recent years the term innovation has come into popular use in public sector areas such as housing (Lee et al. 2010), public health sector (Mohr, 1969; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; King, 1992), and transport sector (Zuylen and Weber, 2002; Geerlings, 1999).

This paper examines the latest development in the ways the city authorities in Greater Kuala Lumpur introduce innovative initiatives to enhance public transport system and how stakeholders respond to it. In Malaysia, Greater Kuala Lumpur refers to the immediate areas beyond the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur boundaries, covering huge conurbation, extending from Kuala Lumpur to major population centers in the peripheries. It covers 10 municipalities, each governed by local authorities of Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya, Shah Alam, Petaling Jaya, Klang, Kajang, Subang Jaya, Selayang, Ampang Jaya and Sepang.
The multimodal public transport system currently serving the cities in the conurbation is far from the desirable standard in terms of availability, frequency, punctuality and rolling stock. The commuter rail service provided by the government-owned company suffers from 40% over capacity, travelling time of more than one hour to city centre from the periphery, frequent breakdown, failure in the air-conditioning system, reduced passenger safety especially women, and deteriorating general level of service. Multimodal public transport system may be the best alternative for the cities, but the connectivity among modes is poor in certain areas, for example between monorail and light rail transit system at the biggest public transport terminal. There is also the problem of poor access to public transport with only about 61% of Klang Valley's population lives within 400 meters of a public bus route. This, in combination with continued growth in the number of private vehicles, has contributed to public transport modal share in Klang Valley falling steadily from 34% in 1985 to 20% in 1997, and reduced further to the current 10-12%.

**Method and Data:**

The main source of information for this article is secondary data published by various transport-related government agencies such as Kuala Lumpur City Hall, Prime Minister Department and Statistics Department. Information on public response towards government plans and measures to enhance public transport services in the study areas was gathered from in-depth interviews with members of the public. Discussions with government officers in-charge of transport plans and consultants specializing in urban transport planning were conducted by the authors as, beyond lecture rooms, they themselves are consultants in the area of public transport and transport economics respectively. To complement the secondary data, intensive literature reviews on public transport issues both in cities of the developed and developing countries were carried out by reading articles published in refereed journals, consultant reports and books.

**Public Transport in Greater Kuala Lumpur:**

The term 'Greater Kuala Lumpur', mentioned for the first time in Malaysian urban planning history in the formulation of the nation's latest five-year development plan (Economic Planning Unit, 2010) refers to the immediate areas beyond the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur boundaries, covering huge conurbation, extending from Kuala Lumpur to major population centers in the peripheries. The five year plan does not specifically mention about definition, but Greater Kuala Lumpur is conceptualized in this paper as an extended urban area, typically consisting of several towns, merging with the suburbs of the central city of Kuala Lumpur. Figure 1 shows some of the more important cities, towns, and population centers in the Greater Kuala Lumpur. The government is aiming to increase public transport patronage from only 12% in 2008 to 25% in 2012 and finally 50% in 2020.

With an estimated 4.5 million population, Greater Kuala Lumpur is served by various modes of public transport. The government-owned bus company RapidKL which commenced operation in 1996 currently ferrying approximately 280,000 passengers daily on its 1,100 buses on 165 bus routes linking some 980 housing estates to the city center and other parts of Greater Kuala Lumpur. Several privately owned bus companies also served the areas and cater for the rests of the passengers. The track-based public transport is served by two light rail transit lines carrying some 350,000 passengers daily (180,000 passengers on Kelana Jaya Line and 170,000 on Ampang line) and a monorail system with a daily patronage of 100,000 passengers (Sharidan Mohd Ali, 2009), all of which is owned by the government. The urban rail commuter services traversed the area linking passengers at the fringes with jobs in the city center. Several privately owned independent bus companies also serve the areas, taking care of some 20% of the total passenger loads. Public transport service is not a profitable business in Greater Kuala Lumpur due to escalating operational costs, especially labour. The government incurred some RM5 million monthly losses to make sure its bus, light rail and monorail services afloat. The multimodal public transport system currently serving the conurbation is far from the desirable standard in terms of availability, frequency, punctuality and rolling stock. The commuter rail service provided by the government-owned company suffers from 40% over capacity, travelling time of more than one hour to city centre from the periphery, frequent breakdown, failure in the air-conditioning system, reduced passenger safety especially women, and deteriorating general level of service. Multimodal public transport system may be the best alternative for the cities, but the connectivity among modes is poor in certain areas, for example between monorail and light rail transit system at the biggest public transport terminal. There is also the problem of poor access to public transport with only about 61% of Klang Valley's population lives within 400 meters of a public bus routes. This, in combination with continued growth in the number of private vehicles, has contributed to public transport modal share in Klang Valley falling steadily from 34% in 1985, to 20% in 1997, and reduced further to the current 10-12%.
Measures to Solve Congestion and Improve Mobility: The Myth of Highway in Greater Kuala Lumpur

In the past Klang Valley has seen investments in building highways as an approach to create congestion-free environment that will help public thriving (Abd Rahim Md Nor, 2010a). Currently there are 19 toll highways of various length and facilities constructed by private companies and operational in Greater Kuala Lumpur (see Table 1 and Figure 2), collecting toll fees from users. The 20th toll highway in the area, the 31 kilometer Kuala Lumpur - Kuala Selangor Highway (KLKS) with 4 interchanges is 67.3% complete, is under construction and scheduled to complete in October 2011. However, constructing urban highways to relief congestion is an out-dated planning method many cities in the world have abandoned long ago as it does not serve its purpose, costly and not sustainable financially and environmentally in the long terms. Private car is analogous to water; it spreads to anywhere so long the space allows. There is no end to the process, until it get congested and you have to build more highways to accommodate even more cars. Soon you are trapped in the vicious circle of highway construction: you construct highways to relief congestion, the new highways are so attractive to cars and become choked, and you end up by building more highways. The problem with the planners is that they did not have a clear vision; they introduced measures to promote public transport use but at the same time allow for a private car-biased policy to run simultaneously. Many attempts have been initiated to relief congestion by building toll and non-toll highways but the results were disappointing, as the following paragraphs show.

In December 1998 the Damansara Puchong Highway (LDP) was opened to the public aimed at providing modern intra-urban highway that allow cars to travel in, out and within residential areas and to access townships like Kepong, Bandar Sri Damansara, Bandar Utama, Taman Tun Dr Ismail, Petaling Jaya, Sunway, Subang Jaya, Puchong and Shah Alam. Stretching 40km with 19 interchanges, the toll highway was constructed to promote faster and convenient local traffic dispersal and serve to complete the Middle Ring Road 2 (MRR2) at the western part of the Klang Valley, providing much needed second ring road which allows cars users to bypass congested city roads. It was planned to alleviate congestion in the city and allows greater capacity on the north-south corridors. However, the congestion relief was temporary, and only after several years, the highway was choked with traffic. During peak hours, the highway is jam-packed and totally inadequate in their current capacity to cater for traffic. The highway operator continued to collect toll even though the highway is impassable; car users queue up to pay toll even after being stuck in a 2km jam before reaching the toll plaza. The initial relief that was brought in by the highway has in fact attracted more traffic into the areas. In Puchong, the non-toll traffic on the LDP has increased by ten-fold, from about 40,000 in 1999 to 400,000 in 2010. Since it commenced operation in 1998, there have been 20 major developments (spanning over 40.5ha or comprising more than 500 units, and 15 medium developments (less than 40.5ha or fewer than 500 units) in this area.
In total, the developments have contributed 85,000 residential units and 17 million sq ft of commercial space while 40,000 more residential units and 2.35 million sq ft of commercial space are expected in the next three to five years. Currently the highway requires three major upgrading works namely the construction of a southbound mainline ramp at the Puchong Intan Interchange, improvement on the Puchong Perdana traffic intersection, and widening works on the mainline between the Puchong Perdana Interchange and Kampung Baru Interchange, with an estimated total cost of RM300 million. Financing would not be a problem as it may come from the revenue collected from the public who use the highway, but the proposed upgrading works has already been challenged by environmentalists and residence associations. Residents of Damansara Utama, who have been there since 1974, set up an action committee and called to save the green belt in Jalan SS 21/44, which the concessionaire had earlier applied to use as part of the upgrade of its Taman Tun Dr Ismail (TTDI) interchange, claiming the land had been gazetted as a reserve for public space by the state government way back in 1984 and they don't want to have a highway right in front of their doors.

Similar futile effort is shown in the construction of the government-funded Middle Ring Road 2 by the JKR. The huge, long and rounding 41.8-kilometer dual-carriageway highway was constructed based on the proposal in the first Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan in 1984, aimed at reducing congestion in the city centre by providing traffic connection between Bandar Sri Damansara-Kepong-Batu Caves-Gombak, Gombak-Ulu Klang-Ampang, and Ampang-Pandan-Cheras-Sri Petaling. Only several years after it was opened to the public in mid-1990s, the toll-free highway again become a nightmare for many users who were crawling in traffic jam. By not charging toll, the highway was so attractive to cars that it reached its design capacity of 120,000 vehicles daily only several years after operation, and continue to absorb traffic to the current level of around 200,000 vehicles. The diamond-shaped of most of the interchanges with traffic is controlled by signals make the feeder road swells up fast and chokes the main artery, thus exceeding the capacity at the interchange. The design capacity did not take into account the city-centre traffic fed into the highway by the Ampang-Kuala Lumpur Highway (AKLEH) and the Dutu-Ulu Klang Expressway (DUKE), both came into the picture later. Traffic-generating development activities along the fringes of the highway exacerbated the situation by continuously pouring more traffic than its capacity. Bandar Tasik Selatan bus terminal, on the southern end of MRR2, currently being upgraded to become the biggest integrated multi-modal transport terminal in the southern part of Klang Valley planned to handle 40,000 passengers and 550 departures and arrivals, adds to the traffic chaos as it joints the exits into the highway. Peak hour traffic using the MRR2 from Kuala Lumpur-Seremban highway into Cheras-Ampang is common. The jam is made worse by fully loaded heavy lorries and trailers using the uphill stretch from Bandar Tasik Selatan towards Cheras. Previously, we have the KESAS and PLUS highways converging into the MRR2 and now we have Maju Expressway and this bus terminal and on the other end, LDP from Kepong, DUKE highway and Besraya highway. JKR has already approved a traffic dispersal plan for one of MRR2's choked junctions in Pandan costing RM104 million. As if it is not enough, the Works Ministry was also planning to build a road linking Sungai Besi to an intersection of the Duta-Ulu Klang Expressway (DUKE) in Setiawangsa as a measure to reduce traffic congestion on the MRR2.

Table 1: Toll Highways in Greater Kuala Lumpur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Highway</th>
<th>Length (km)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Interchange</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shah Alam Expressway (KESAS)</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>Sept 1998</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur-Karak Highway</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>April 1999</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheras-Kajang Highway</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>Jan 1999</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damansara-Puchong Highway (LDP)</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>Jan 1999</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sungai Besi Highway (BESRAYA)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>Jan 1999</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ampang Elavated Highway (AKLEH)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>Dec 2000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Kuala Lumpur Traffic Dispersal Scheme Highway (SPRINT)</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New North Klang Strait Bypass Highway</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East West Link Expressway</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajang Highway (SILK)</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Pantai Expressway (NPE)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Coast Highway (LPT)</td>
<td>169.0</td>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur-Putrajaya Highway (MAJU)</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>Dec 2004</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guthrie Corridor Expressway</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemuning-Shah Alam Highway (LKSA)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART Tunnel</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>April 2007</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutu-Ulu Klang Expressway (DUKE)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>Jan 2009</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajang-Seremban Highway (KASEH)</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>Oct 2009</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Klang Valley Expressway (SKVE)</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Some of the previous measures adopted by the city authorities to relieve congestion are creative and world class in terms of design, technology and costs, but it turned out to be temporary. When the RM2.5 billion 9.7-km SMART tunnel commenced operation in July 2007, many car users expected it would relieve congestion in the southern part of the city by providing an alternative route between the Kuala Lumpur City Centre around the Kampung Pandan roundabout and the southern gateway at TUDM on the Sungai Besi-Seremban Highway. The initial enthusiasm of smooth traffic flow in the tunnel did not last long, as after only two years the tunnel is jammed with private cars almost every day during morning and afternoon peak hours. When stuck in the crawling traffic, many did not realise or forget that the award-winning multi-billion ringgit project is only a flood bypass tunnel to divert excess flood water in the city centre to a holding pond in Kampung Berembang before it is channeled through the tunnel to a storages pond in Taman Desa and subsequently discharged into the river at the downstream end. Since SMART began its operations, it has successfully handled a total of 79 storm events, diverting flood water up to one million cubic meter in one occasion, but its role in diverting traffic to reduce congestion is questionable.

Recent Government Initiatives:

In 1991, just after the end of the New Economic Policy 1970-1990, Malaysia committed to another long-term development plan, the Vision 2020, with the objective to become a fully developed nation by 2020. Although the country has made progress so far, at current rate of growth, the nation is in danger of losing its competitiveness and falling short of our economic and social ambitions. It was felt that a fundamental change is required, not just in economic and social performance, but also in the delivery of public goods and services, including public transport, that underpin ability to develop.

To meet the challenges standing in its way of achieving Vision 2020, the country has committed itself to a Government Transformation Program (GTP) (Pemandu, 2010), in accordance with the principles of 1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now. Basically, the GTP is a long term development plan that details the objectives, outcomes and the initial set of actions in areas identified as National Key Result Areas (NKRA). In parallel, the National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC) formulated the country’s New Economic Model, while the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) developed the Tenth Malaysia Plan 2010-2015, both have been released in 2010, and the road map roadmap embedded in the GTP should be read together with those plans.

Enhancing public transport is one the six areas targeted in the NKRA, apart from reducing crime, fighting corruption, improving student outcomes, raising living standards of low-income households, and improving rural basic infrastructure. In the public transport sector, the main objectives of the NKRA are to raise public transport modal share from the current 13% to 25% by 2012 for morning peak period, improve reliability and journey times, enhance comfort and convenience, and improve accessibility and connectivity so that the percentage of the population living within 400 meters of a public transport route increases from 63% to 75% in 2012 (Abd Rahim Md Nor & Nor Ghani Md Nor, 2010).
The NKRA for public transport component will embark on measures to increase rail capacity, increase bus fleets and provide more priority measures for this mod, stimulate demand for travel on public transport rather than private cars and traffic management and parking facilities at the city fringes so that less number of personal cars and heavy vehicles would enter the city centre (see Table 2). Within the city centre, there will be two types of public transport hubs namely the Intra-City Terminal Hubs at Pudu to facilitate the flow of traffic from the suburbs into the city, and the Final City Terminal (Hentian Akhir Bandar) that will facilitate the movement of passengers and public transport vehicles within the city centre to reduce congestion and streamline overlapping routes. Realising that enforcement and monitoring are critical to ensure operators adhere to minimum service and operational standards, efforts will be initiated to integrate backend IT systems and launch joint on-the-ground enforcement efforts, across all major enforcement agencies such as local authorities, Road Transport Department and the traffic arm of the police. The decade-old CVLV (Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board) was abolished at the end of 2010, and was replaced with the newly formed Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD). This new entity will create a single point of accountability for public transport by integrating the 12 ministries and various agencies currently involved in different aspects of public transport. SPAD in fact was tasked with revamping the entire public transport system (Abd Rahim Md Nor, 2010b and 2010c), and was be given the mandate to take over all license issuing authorities, reorganise the bus network, integrate smart ticketing and monitor the overall standard performance of all public transport services.

### Table 2: Short-Term Strategy In Enhancing Public Transport Capacity.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Key Result Areas</th>
<th>Strategy and Target</th>
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| Public Transport Morning Peak Hours Modal Share | • Four bus expressway transit routes (RapidBET) and one high-speed limited stop services were launched in January 2010, reducing travel time by over 50% for the routes  
  • Public transport share to be raised from 13% in 2010 to 25% by 2012                                                                        |
| Rail-Based Public Transport           | • To increase capacity of rail by between 1.7 to 4.0 times depending on specific line, through refurbishments and purchase of new rolling stock, by 2012  
  • Adding 8 sets of four-car trains on Kelana Jaya LRT Line in early 2010, enhancing ridership by 7%, and purchase another 27 sets by 2012  
  • Extending Kelana Jaya and Ampang LRT lines by 34 kilometres by 2012  
  • Purchase of 38 new six-car EMUs (Electric Multiple Unit) for the KTM Komuter system by 2012  
  • Introducing above and under-ground 156-km MRT (Mass Rapid Transit) tracks, to be carried out as a Public-Private Partnership Initiatives, to cater for 2 million trips daily |
| Exclusive Bus Lanes                   | • Introducing dedicated rights-of-way for buses along 12 major corridors, carrying 55,000 to 55,000 passengers during the morning peak hours or 6% to 9% of total public transport ridership, by 2012  
  • Introducing a 49-km BRT system on three major corridors  
  • To be increased from 200 buses in 2010 to 850 by 2012  
  • To add 53 new bus routes to the system by 2012 to address currently unserved areas  
  • Introducing an integrated ticketing platform and fare structure (1Ticket, 1Seamless Journey concept across all 16 operators in Klang Valley)  
  • Increasing parking spaces from 4,000 in 2010 to 6,800 across 14 rail stations  
  • outside the urban core  
  • Enhancing feeder services into rail stations |
| Bus Fleet                             |  
  • Introducing two ITT (Integrated Transport Terminal) in Bandar Tasik Selatan and Gombak by 2012  
  • Building a third ITT possibly in Sungai Buluh after 2012  
  • Introducing Intra-City Terminals at Pasarana  
  • Kota, Plaza Rakyat and Pudu to facilitate the flow of traffic from the suburbs into the City  
  • Introducing 14 Hentian Akhir Bandars (HAB) that will facilitate the movement of passengers and public transport vehicles within the city centre to reduce congestion and streamline overlapping routes |
| Traffic Management                    |  
  • Introducing the Land Public Transport Commission (SPAD), replacing the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (CVLB) |

Source: Economic Planning Unit, 2010; Pemandu, 2010
Stakeholders Response To Government Policy:

In urban public transport, there are at least four stakeholders with different and sometimes conflicting vested interests, namely passengers, operators, the private car users and the regulators. Passengers are looking for the cheapest possible fares to match their limited income as the majority of these people belongs to the low earning sections of the urban communities, mostly the young, college-going students, and those who are just completed formal education and looking for jobs. In Greater Kuala Lumpur, females are more than males in terms of public transport use due to the more limited alternatives available for them. Unlike males who can easily use motorcycle as a cheap alternative to personal cars and bus in a permitting tropical climate like Malaysia, females are less likely to use motorcycles due to their physical characteristics, tradition and culture, hence their dependence on bus and rail.

Regardless of whether the city is prospering or stagnant in terms of economic and finance, there always a certain proportion of the urban population who are dependent on public transport due to their inferior socio-economic conditions and gender. For this captive transport users, they welcome the initiatives introduced by the government to enhance public transport capacities and efficiencies, in the hope that it will improve their mobility to workplaces, schools and recreation.

Private operators are always cautious and skeptical to any efforts initiated by the government to improve public transport services. They are positive and receptive to government plans so long as it would not adversely affect their businesses which is sensitive to rising costs. Public transport is not a lucrative business due to increasing costs and yet passengers are looking for cheap fare and against increase in fare even in the long terms. A case in point is their malaise response to a newly built multi-million ringgit integrated public transport terminal in the southern part of Greater Kuala Lumpur. When it was officially opened on 1 January 2011, only 10 out of 190 bus companies moved in and use the state-of-the art US$190 million six floor bus terminal. They refused to move because the cost of operating from the terminal was four times higher than at other terminals, including the old bus terminal at Puduraya. At the new terminal, for each bus entering the ultra-modern terminal, the bus companies were charged RM10 (US$3.3) per entry and RM10 per exit, apart from RM1 (US$0.30) charge per passenger for their tickets, totaling on average RM60 (US$20) per bus per trip.

Apart from providing better transport services to public-transport dependent people, the objective of the innovative plans embarked on by the city authorities is to enticing regular personal users to leave their cars and shift to public transport especially the track-based mode. However, response from private car owners is expected to be not encouraging because bus and rail is not the best alternative to personal cars in terms of comfort, convenience and status. Unless complementary plan to restrict car use through car restraint schemes such as in Singapore and London, people who have been using cars would be attracted to bus or rail.

Conclusion:

Since the new Prime Minister took office in mid-2009, people have seen a number of measures to improve public transport in Greater Kuala Lumpur was adopted by the city authorities with strong financial backing and political commitment from the Federal Government. The cities in the conurbation have never seen such a concerted effort initiated by the government to improve public transport with measures ranging from financial assistance and policy formulation to restructuring agencies that deals with public transport operation, laws and regulations. While the general public who are dependent on public transport as a mean of mobility would be receptive to these innovative measures, the same cannot be said about car owners. Without counter measures to restrict private cars use, those who have been using cars would not be easily enticed to use public transport. It is proposed that the recent initiatives to improve public transport in Greater Kuala Lumpur should be complemented with concrete plan to discourage the car-dependent public to leave their cars at home and shift to bus and rail.

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