




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Ten Years Of Papua Integration With The Republic Of Indonesia From 1963 To 1973

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ABSTRACT

Political integration or commonly known as "national integration" is basically a dynamic process and prone to follow social dynamics and therefore should not be seen as something to be taken for granted. This political integration is very much dependent upon ways and predispositions of the political ruling party understanding and treating the social aspiration in accordance with a particular period. Bearing this in mind, this article is trying to describe how government efforts were to create political integration in Papua, the socio-economic and political conditions of Papua during that period, and how Papuans made sense of the integration process during the period after New York Agreement in 1962, during the referendum in 1969 until the first four years of post referendum. Using historical approach and political integration theory, it has been found that since the beginning of adaptation of Papuans with Indonesians, the Papuans found many things to be new. Besides, the government-adopted model by the Indonesian government was very different from that of the Dutch. Socio-economic and political life had to experience a period of quarantine, meaning that socio-cultural, economic, and political life was determined very much by the interests of Reviews those in power. Situation of this kind tended to give birth to groups of interests in the community. There were two play groups: the pro-integration group and the anti-integration group which was then materialized in the Free Papua Movement (known in Indonesian as the Free Papua Movement, OPM), and some other social protest groups.

INTRODUCTION

Background:

Integration process, national integration in particular, is a political process which is very complex and long-term because of the political aspect that is more prominent. This political aspect is closely related to other aspects of life, especially with the background of socio-cultural and economic systems. Socio-cultural background and the economy are also complex as well if the nation contains multiple ethnics inhabiting a vast range of archipelagoes such as Indonesia. This means that the strengthening and weakening situation of the national integration in Indonesia is largely determined by the developments in the political, defense and security, economy as well as social culture of the country. In turn, this does not necessarily reduce the other determining factors, namely the international situation. (Saafroedin Bahar and AB Tangdililing, 1996)

Papua Province as one area in the Republic of Indonesia is one of the many regions in Indonesia which is prone to have problems on national integration. Tracing back the history of Papua's integration "returned to the motherland's lap", this region is different from other regions in Indonesia. It required a period of five years after the proclamation of August 17th, 1945 for the region to be freed from the authority of the invaders. Papua's integration history records a relatively long struggle, which is for about 14 years. It was all started from the

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Round Table Conference in 1949 to the New York Agreement of Papua in 1962. Papua has then become the only province that "returned to the motherland's lap" through the New York Agreement signed by the Netherlands and Indonesian government on August 15th, 1962. Under the treaty, on October 1st, 1962 the power was handed over from the Dutch government to the interim government of the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), and on May 1st, 1963, UNTEA administration handed over the administration power to the Indonesian government.

The Indonesian government through various approaches attempted to build or instill the values of the new life that has not been previously known to the people of Papua. The most important agenda was to "take the hearts of the people" which was started to intensify by the Indonesian government during the transitional period (1963-1969) in Papua. The point was the creation of "Indonesianization" (national integration). With this process, it is expected that in accordance to the New York Agreement in 1962, it can be used to help the people of Papua, when asked to take part in the election *Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat* (PEPERA) in 1969.

Along with the Indonesian government's efforts to inculcate the values of being Indonesia that Papuans had not previously experienced, a number of irregularities that lead to people's disappointment were identified. The disappointment has been growing bigger and bigger, even after PEPERA which marked the integration of Papua into The Unitary State of Indonesia.

Until now, there have been several studies that reveal the problem of Papua national integration, among other things are work by R.Z. Leirissa et al. titled "*Sejarah Proses Integrasi Irian Jaya*" (1996). In one section of their paper, it is explained that the impact of the historical process of integration of Papua into Indonesia is the birth of Free Papua Movement. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (1993) mentions that the integration problem in Papua is much influenced by horizontal dimensions (territorial). Secondly, the integration process in Papua has been hampered due to the presence of separatist movement. In line with the opinion stated by Nazaruddin, John R.G. Djopari, in his graduate thesis that has been published in books titled "*Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*" (1993), describes the integration of Papua as a political agenda. He posits that the construction carried out in Papua encounter various problems. One of the problems is: a challenge to the political integration in Papua. This is obviously reflected in the uprising of the Free Papua Movement.

Related to the studies described above, Ros Christ Garnaut and Manning (1979) have revealed the integration condition in Papua. In terms of economic and social, they explain how the region had very limited means of social and economic during the transition period. In his article titled "Overview of Empirical National Integration Papua: International Aspects" published by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (1993), it was revealed that, in addition to the relations between Indonesia - Papua New Guinea (PNG) which affected the problem of national integration in Papua, the social, cultural, and economic conditions created in the period of transition in Papua also affect the condition of the national integration in Papua.

Another best book is the biography of Acub Zainal (1998) written by Ki Nurinwa Hendrowinoto S., et al. Acub Zainal was an army officer when Indonesia began to run the government in Papua (1969), he served as the Commander of Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih - Papua. More or less the story was about his experience in the military field as well as when he was appointed the Governor of West Irian after-PEPERA, so that the book is worthy of scrutiny.

Regarding the danger of disintegration of the Indonesian nation, a collection of writings by Haris Shams, et al (1999) is available to be studied. Syamsuddin Haris, et al. disclosed various root causes in 4 (four) armed conflicts, namely Aceh, Riau, Papua and East Timor. *Spesipik Papua* is the result of a study of Dhuroruddin Mashad and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti. According to them, the problem of separatist and the wishes of the Papuans to separate from The Unitary State of Indonesia were caused by the imbalance of the central government policies (of the New Order) in the field of socio-cultural, economic and political and legal as well as foreign sympathy. It was also said that the history of integrating Papua triggered a threat of disintegration of the nation.

In some work discussed above, the disclosure is directed towards the political aspect in Papua from the time of integration to after-integration. Explanations about the socio-cultural and economic were limitedly expressed. Therefore, by taking into account a variety of explanations above and criticisms, the researchers are interested to study "The 10 Years Integration Period of Papua into The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (1963-1973)".

B. Problems:

Problems in this study can be formulated in the questions below:

1. How was the Indonesian government effort to create national integration in Papua during the transition period?
2. Did the socio-cultural, economic, political situations in Papua at that time support the conception of national integration?
3. What were the reactions of the Papuans against the national integration pursued at that time?

Objectives And Research Benefits:**A. Objectives:**

With the reference to the problem, the purposes of this study are to describe:

1. The Indonesian government's effort to create national integration in Papua;
2. The socio-cultural, economic and political situations in Papua at that time which may promote the conception of national integration;
3. The reactions of the Papuans towards the national integration concept at that time.

B. Significance:

The result is expected to be a contribution to the development of the study of political history in Indonesia, especially on aspects that determine the creation of national integration in the case of Papua.

Approach And Theoretical Framework:**Approach:**

Basically, a social change is caused by the presence of individual or collective potential to make changes or to determine their own fate. Therefore, this study uses the structural approach (Lloyd, 1963), because what to be revealed are the human behaviors that are rooted in the social structure of the individual himself. By studying the reality of the individual (agent) and social structure (role, rule, interaction and mentality) which are intangible (obtained from historical sources), this study is then expected to reveal the causal factor in the phenomenon of national integration in Papua during the transitional phase of up to the first 4 (four) years of after-PEPERA. With the structural approach, the main factors that lead to the national integration in Papua at that time may be disclosed.

The steps of the historical research used in this study include (1) starting with the collection of sources, (2) source criticism, (3) source analysis, and (4) explanation of causality (Bloch, 1989). Meanwhile, the step for collecting the data sources is through document/literature study technique. Literature study is used for data from newspapers, magazines, brochures, government reports and the church documents as well as other literature relevant to this study. Data collection using that technique is to be conducted in Jayapura, since according to the opinion of the researcher the possibility of obtaining the necessary data is likely to be possible in the region.

After collecting the data sources, the sources will be criticized towards both oral and written sources. Criticism and analysis of data are based on the content analysis work steps proposed by Krippendorff (2000) and Moleong (1997).

Theoretical Framework:

The theory used for analyzing the problem in this research is the theory of national integration. According to J. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, the process of national unity in a country consists of two dimensions: vertical (elite - mass) and horizontal (territorial). Vertical integration includes problems that exist in the vertical level aiming to bridge the gap differences that may exist between the elite and the masses in order to develop an integrated political process and participating political communities. Territorial integration is the integration in a horizontal level in order to reduce tensions and discontinuities of regional cultures in the case of creating a politically homogenous society. (Saafroedin Bahar and AB Tandililing, 1993).

According to Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (in Saafroedin Bahar and AB Tandililing, 1993), the opinion of Coleman and Rosberg are just focused on the types of factors integrated. In fact, there are many other elements that affect and determine the existence of the elite - mass gap and the territorial differences. The elements meant are the aspects of human life that know no boundaries of space and time and other limitations. The points include: political, economic, social and cultural. Therefore, the most important is how the emerging factors in the society that determined the process.

Findings And Discussions:**A. Conditions Prior to May 1st, 1963 in Papua:**

Papua is one of the areas in Indonesia that was said to return into The Unitary State of Indonesia based on the intervention of the United Nations. The reality of the Dutch colonialism conducted in the Papua region was very different from that in other regions in Indonesia. As it said that the colonialism in Java was that the people undergo the practice of forced labor, tortured, and dead, induced by the Dutch colonists in the Dutch East Indies, It was not like that in Papua. For most people, the Netherlands were not colonizers. The main element of thesis is that the Netherlands in Papua were more on the mission of spreading the Gospel and other humanitarian missions rather than conquering the land. (See Dhuroruddin Mashad and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, 1996).

The Papuans experienced the hardship when adapting to the Indonesian culture as according to the New York Agreement in 1962 the cultures were comparatively very different. Since the beginning, the Papuans saw how the behaviors exhibited by the Indonesian military and civil officials at the time. (Nurinwa Hendrowinoto Ki S., 2001)

The reign of the guardianship agency of the United Nations, United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), was relatively short (October 1962 till April 1963). This resulted in UNTEA having not been able to realize a development policy that was scheduled. UNTEA emphasized more on the security policy in Papua. As a result, there were mass demonstrations; UNTEA, through Dr Djalal Abdoh, handed over the power to the Indonesian government on May 1st, 1963. (The Liang Gie and F. Soegeng Istanto, 1968)

B. Reaction of National Integration Society Meaning:

In relation to national integration, this problem was reflected in the real uprising of Free Papua Organization (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*-OPM), which have broken out since July 26th, 1965. The movement that started from Manokwari was led by Sergeant Major Permenas Ferry Awom, a former member of Papua Volunteer Battalion (Papua Vrijwilligers Corps) formed by the Netherlands. (Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, 1989; John RG Djopari, 1992).

When examined, the outbreaks of the OPM separatist movements were caused by the very limited communication especially in a political sense. Yet, it was actually the kind of communication which was expected to give effect to the political experience or political socialization process of the Papuans. This was of certainly under a reason, when the Papuan community education during the Dutch colonial period was minimal which resulted in the lack of communication with the nationalist movement outside Papua. It should then be noted that the people of Papua have never known the spirit of Youth Pledge in 1928.

Indonesia's economic and political crisis in the 1960s also played a role in understanding the socio-economic condition of the Papua region at that time. Indonesia's own economic situation at that time suffered a drawback so that the first sector which was prioritized was the development of the regional administration, formal education and health services. To complete the three things, there was first an adjustment on the value for money and price. The 1962-1968 economic year in Indonesia, of which leader was Sukarno at that time, experience a dramatic retreat characterized by symptoms of uncontrollable hyperinflation. Meanwhile, the management of the residual value for money in Papua's economy after the Dutch colonialism was much higher at that time and could last up to five years. However, after joining Indonesia, the adjustment process was inhibited for 7 years because at that time Soekarno concerned more about the prestige by holding the confrontation with Malaysia rather than taking care of socioeconomic problems which was the result of taking over of the power over Papua. Actually, Indonesia had received a funding of \$30 million from the United Nations called FUNDWI which was actually a contribution from the Netherlands. However, all of the funding cannot be disbursed because at that time Indonesia was busy in confronting Malaysia such that the fund from FUNDWI was frozen because Indonesia's membership in the UN was discharged. Not until 1971, the adjustment process of rupiah between Papua and Indonesia finished, so that real development could be then initiated (Djopari, 1992; Nurinwa Hendrowinoto Ki S., *et al*, 2001).

While at the same time, the Indonesian government officials stationed in Papua and the people who migrated there behaved very poorly by exploiting the difference in the currency values as well as the supply of goods imported in Papua for personal gain. This took place just when the indigenous people began to learn about his new compatriots.

Another problem eventually arose of which primary concern was the material and the main theme in society was a dogma stating that Indonesia, including Papua, had been colonized by the Dutch for 350 years. In turn, this promoted the implications of poverty and oppression whereas the concept of the poor and oppressed people of Papua in relation to the Dutch colonial was clearly not appropriate. In regard to the type of colonialism of the Netherlands to the Papuan context was different Papua did not have the same condition such as that experienced by other regions. Moreover, as a result of the mismanagement of Indonesian policies, some people secretly or openly supported OPM. They considered Indonesia as a new invader implied in the reflection of the government apparatus abusive acts, such as forcibly taking the goods left by the Netherlands or utilizing OPM issue allegations to justify actions that were not commendable from the Indonesian military officers. (Dhuroruddin Mashad and Pledge Nusa Bhakti, 2001)

Implementation of PEPERA in 1969 and the Government's Efforts to Build Public Trust:

As the final realization of the New York Agreement, besides the issue of UNTEA, as well as the taking over process to Indonesia in 1963, it was stipulated that it should be no later than the year 1969 that the Republic of Indonesia had had to implement the *Act of Free Choice*. This remarks that the problem of Papua normative issue (international law) has been closed since the end of 1969. Therefore, this part then describes the atmosphere of PEPERA, according to Amir Machmud memoirs (1987).

The last section of Papua clashes occurred in the UN General Assembly on November 19th, 1969 when the draft of the joint resolution between Indonesia and the Netherlands received 84 votes for agreement, none for rejection, and 30 for abstain. The large number of people who abstained was surprising because most come from the African countries that, although in general support the return of the territory to Indonesia, objected to the fact that the principle of "one person, one vote" is not included in the "act of free choice", where the revision

was completed. Instead, the Indonesian government decided to give the choice in the hands of 8 consultative councils, whose members are elected through consensus. This means that the chiefs of tribes and other community leaders, most of whom were illiterate, were given the right to decide. As expected, as reported by the Secretary General, the answer of the consultative councils was identical that Papua chose to stay in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Regarding the internal problems faced by Indonesia, in relation with the issue of free elections, the Foreign Minister Adam Malik showed that it was easy to criticize the implementation of a political test which is difficult and controversial. Then, it was indeed the case of setting to hold a free choice, especially if the action should comply with the international standards, which refers to the adoption of Western standards to the conditions and situations in Asia, where in fact those standards do not always match. Especially for Papua, which is known as one of the retarded regions, one must have certain considerations for the circumstances in dealing with the issues in Papua.

Thus, it is true that the implementation of the agreement was not in compliance with the international treaty with the Netherlands, but it was the "ending a long and hard struggle".

Mr. Fernando Ortizan representing the Secretary General agreed with the opinion of Adam Malik. In conclusion of the report, it was said that "based on the facts and documents referred to, it could be said that, with the limitations that feature the geological characteristics of the region and the general political situation in the region, an act of free elections had been conducted in Papua. "Free" in accordance with the practice in Indonesia where the residents' representatives stated they would keep joining with Indonesia.

Regarding the statement of the Papuan population to remain part of Indonesia that was the work of Amir Mahmud, as the representative of Indonesia for the implementation of PEPERA. In his autobiography, it is said that when he accepted the job he never questioned the status of Papua. For him, the region had become part of RI and would remain so. In preparing the program, he had always been haunted by the possibility of how and what action would have been performed if the majority of the Papuans chose to separate from the Republic of Indonesia. For the government of Indonesia, West Papua must remain in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia so that in practicing PEPERA the ways used were somewhat not in accordance with the international law. In the course of reviewing areas in Papua, before PEPERA, he saw that the largest part of the population in the region was not yet politically conscious, so that later in PEPERA, the representatives of the population could just simply say something like, "Suharto", "Red and White", or "The Republic of Indonesia." Yet in a report after returning from the review of PEPERA, it was said that "the reality shows that the majority of people are not sympathetic to the Republic of Indonesia".

After the Papuans officially proclaimed to be part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia through PEPERA, the immediate improvement of development in Papua was to be completed. According to Ki S. Henrowinoto, et al., Acub Zainal's biographer, it is said that when Acub Zainal became the Regional Commander (*Pangdam*) XII Cendrawasih, he made a number of policies, including "*koteka* operation" and the construction of infrastructures. More vigorous development efforts were also carried out when he was appointed the governor of Papua in 1973. Every effort was shown in order to raise public confidence in the Indonesian government and the armed forces. However, as a result of his policies, he was dismissed from his position as the governor as well as his military career.

Therefore, it can be said that the real development in Papua was completed after the integration in 1969. Previously, people were ordered by the under the condition of being quarantined. That is, when the New York Agreement was ratified in 1962, the population and the Papua Island were subjects to the status of where the entire social life, politics, and economy were all determined by the Indonesian government. The conditions certainly brought an impact on the issue of political integration of Papua manifested in Free Papua Movement and some other opposing movements.

Conclusions:

Since the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) handed Papua over to the government of the Republic of Indonesia on May 1st, 1963, Papua has brought many complex issues, including that in security matter. In an effort to grow national awareness, the Indonesian government has started to implement development policies in various sectors. However, due to the limitations of the domestic economy of Indonesia, the development policies carried out were only on the social, political and security matters. This process does not run properly because along with it the quarantine conditions are still applied in Papua.

The social, economic, and political conditions of Papua between 1963 and 1969 were virtually very pity. Because when they experience a quarantine status, they witnessed how the Indonesian government officials and others who were stationed in Papua had behaved badly. They conducted "open robbery". The Indonesian government officials stationed in Papua and the people who migrated there behaved very poorly by exploiting the difference in the currency values as well as the supply of goods imported in Papua for personal gain. This took place just when the indigenous people began to learn about his new compatriots. The public expression of

extreme disappointment appeared in the form of Free Papua Movement (OPM), which has erupted since July 26th, 1965.

The implementation of the *Act of Free Choice* in 1969 was the realization of one of the agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands contained in the New York Agreement in 1962. Through a referendum in 1969, it was stated that Papua's normative issue (international law) is over since the end of 1969.

It is very unfortunate, however, that the "Indonesian strategy" after May 1st, 1963, during and after-PEPERA shows that in fact the political victory in diplomacy of Indonesia over the Netherlands, in its relation to the development in Papua, has not been proven by a certain policy to calm the hearts of the local people. In fact, what has so far been encountered and experience by the community is economic exploitation and intimidation by the military.

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